.. utting off all aid to N. Korea and letting them “sweat it out”. U.
S. public support would be instrumental in this.2.
) The United States should utilize constructive engagement to gain more influence. Tools for this would be KEDO and humanitarian aid that could be directly sent and distributed by the United States. 3.) Do nothing. By doing nothing we can let the North Korean government destroy itself. Our involvement may be what is keeping the government in power. 4.) Military invasion of North Korea.
Take control of their economy and let Korea unite into one nation. These options are all viable, but perhaps not realistic solutions to the North Korean problem. For instance, a military invasion of North Korea, while some in the government may want it is not acceptable. The Department of State would not support this option either seeing their extensive efforts already in place.
Domestic would generally be unsupportive, and support in Congress appears almost obsolete. Public opinion abroad might turn overwhelmingly anti-American and the United States would be could be forced with a coalition of Asian states against it. Also this would not back the United States morally righteous opinion of itself. Therefore, we can conclude that this option is neither achievable nor realistic.Option three, doing nothing, is also a viable solution.
Could it happen though? The United States may already have too many interests and groundwork laid in North Korea to simply take everything aback and cut off all support. Again, public opinion comes into play. The media would exploit this decision as mean and cruel. That in turn would put pressure on the public servants who run the government.They might be compelled to alter the decision.
This would not be a very humanitarian option and might conflict with the presidents seemingly more idealistic foreign policy. The Department of Defense also would not be keen on the idea seeing it would give the North Koreans an opportunity to mobilize its resources, perhaps even develop nuclear weapons. Therefore, this is also not a realistic option. Option two seems more realistic. It also seems to be the current foreign policy being used on North Korea as dictated by the State Department.The State Department has the task of overseeing the implementation of the Agreed Framework of 1994. They can use KEDO and the Agreed Framework to put pressure on the North Korean government to make concessions and reforms. This would be a peaceful process that would only require time and cooperation from most of the legislative and executive branches of the government.
It would also require adequate help from Japan and South Korea. China might be a wild card to throw into this as well. They could help the North Koreans restructure their system away from a command economy and provide leadership in relations with the United States and the United Nations.Charles Kartman stated in his address to the House International Relations Committee, “Through engagement, in 1994 we concluded with the DPRK the Agreed Framework to deal with the DPRKs nuclear program.” He also stated, “Although it is a difficult task we are convinced that we can achieve our objectives best by carefully engaging the North Korean regime, not by isolating it.” This clearly shows the entire State Departments views towards North Korea: constructive engagement.
In response to the missile test of August 31, 1998, we can observe that the United States is responding to this point of view as if it were not really important in the grand scheme of dealings with North Korea, although it should not be repeated. Notice that no extremely harsh measures were imposed against North Korea for this. Implementation of KEDO went along as planned. Kartmans statements above can illustrate that the basis of this decision is deeply rooted in the Agreed Framework and the precedent that was started with it.The strength of this argument lies in the fact that North Korea has not developed any nuclear weapons (that we know of at this time) and that engagement resolved a crisis in 1994. The weaknesses of this argument are that it gives too much leeway to North Korea in terms of what happened August 31. Was that actually a satellite launch or was it a test for their new missile for potential buyers elsewhere? We still do not know what is contained in the two underground sites that they hold and we are still unsure of where all of the nuclear products have gone. This system is based on a level of trust and the assumption that North Korea will play by the rules.
In a pre-production copy of a report to Congress, the Committee to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States stated that development of the Taepo-Dong 2 is currently taking place.Our knowledge of their ability to use this weapon may be very short before the actual launching. This missile is thought to have a long enough range to target most military bases in Alaska as well as an area from Phoenix, Arizona to Madison, Wisconsin. This could be used to target the United States and other countries with nuclear weapons that could be developed away from the watchful eyes of the United States. The fourth option of the United States would be to increase military pressure on the North Korean government by taking a strong leadership role in the International Community. Richard V.Allen, an analyst for the Heritage Foundation, wrote an essay on Ten Steps to Address North Koreas Nuclear Threat. The general scheme of the document is the basis for this argument.
The United States must be ready militarily for a backlash from the North Korean government. The United States should lead the allied coalition for a strong policy against North Korea. They need to stop funding and technology transfers coming from other countries, especially Japan, China and Russia.Koreans in Japan send as much as one billion dollars a year in aid to North Korea.
If this is cut off, we can effectively use sanctions against North Korea. Korea uses much of this money to buy oil from China, who supplies up to 75% of North Koreas imported oil. China is also suspected to be a principle supplier of technology information to North Korea. The United States should also make sure to let it be known to China and Russia that sanctions are sanctions and the United States expects them to be followed. Non-compliance consequences could be set up to prompt a more pro-US trade relation between those countries and North Korea.
US forces should be deployed to counter any North Korean attack on South Korea or its neighbors. If the North Korean government collapses, it might lash out militarily as it goes, leaving behind a war-zone in the wake of its destruction. The launch of the missile on August 31 only goes to bolster this argument, the worse off the people become, the better equipped the government becomes militarily and the more desperate they become. Public support in the United States would be essential to the implementation of this. That could determine partisan support in congress.That support would be greatly needed to fully implement this. Only a total conviction would be fully effective.
It could not be half-asked. The pressure built on North Korea would hopefully force it to comply with United States demands and maybe even collaborate with South Korea over some issues of migration and maybe even unification. The weakness of this position is that it is so complex.The end result can only be achieved by a full commitment.
Past United States history has shown that since Vietnam the country is very reluctant to go to war unless we are sure to win (Persian Gulf), also the Nixon Doctrine may be used in retaliation to U.S. increased military presence in Asia. Vietnam will be used as an example and the media may turn the situation sour. This might also lead North Korea to desperation in their anticipation of a U.S. attack. They could attack South Korea, hoping to gain territory to be used for bargaining.
Also the volatile nature of the North Korean government lends another hand to this issue.What will the North Koreans reaction be when the United States withdraws from the Agreed Framework 0f 1994? It is currently unpredictable. The Best Solution Many factors must go into the United States foreign policy decision about North Korea. There are many long term and short term complications that one must consider. Unification is an enormous factor. It is generally thought that there is a sense of manifest destiny on the Korean peninsula. But Korean unification could be costly and painful. Estimates are that the cost could amount to something like $800 billion over ten years.
This is based upon the assumption that a German model will be used with heavy expenditures on social welfare and environmental cleansing. That is a long-term implication of policy. Both options one and two work to achieve this but through different ways. The best solution in my opinion is option number one. I agree with the slightly more idealistic option.It warrants a peaceful solution that would perhaps ease the North and South into unification over a long, extended period of time.
The increase of troops in option two could serve to undermine security on the Korean Peninsula. “Reducing an adversarys security can reduce the states own security in a wayby increasing the value the adversary places on expansion, thereby making it harder to deter.” The United States buildup of military on the Korean Peninsula could serve to make the North Koreans believe that we intend them for offensive use. The first option also seems better to me because is has proven successful in a number of ways so far. While the North Koreans are still building missiles, they are not building nuclear warheads to arm them with. The non-proliferation aspects of this option work. The IAEA is monitoring the nuclear reactors there effectively.
Although things are not quite what we desire, cooperation is being used to benefit all. North Korea will greatly benefit from the two new energy reactors and the world will benefit from them not becoming a nuclear power. North Korea still will remain a threat to peace and stability in northeast Asia. We can only attempt to deal with them as we did with South Africa. Hopefully, the recent domestic problems will fuel dissent among the North Koreans and perhaps there will be an overthrow of the government (although unlikely at this time). Economically, it is more beneficial to aid them.
We appear to the world community to promote economic welfare and humanitarian aid while we establish closer links to our partners in KEDO. North Korea could ease into the unification process by working together with the South to build the new power plants. The people working together might inspire a new age to the Korean Peninsula and might push the people of North Korea to want reform.The Four-Party Peace Talks might yield progress yet, although when will progress come about is another question. This option is the long and tedious process of negotiation, testing each others will and making concessions towards progress. This seems to be the logical choice in light of public opinion today and the growing anti-war trend in world politics. A change could be made however in the nature of the aid that is being given to North Korea in the form of food.
Instead of going through International groups, the United States should take the initiative to give and distribute the aid themselves. If United States workers got contracts to ship and distribute the food aid, it might possibly help the situation.It would do this by improving relations on the grass roots level. It might help settle anti-United States feelings that are running high in Korea. Stronger leadership is another pre-requisite for a change in the current situation The United States must be resolute in its dealings with North Korea. Without strong leadership, partisan politics could restrain the implementation of KEDO and other vital resources to the Korean Peace Process. KEDO can not survive without funding from the United States government.
Congress must appropriate the money as it sees fit.It will be the job of the leader to convince Congress and the whole nation that this is the right option. Conclusion The United States dilemma towards North Korea was heightened by the August 31, 1998 launch of the new missile. The incident tightened an already tight operation. The United States responded to it in two different manners. Domestically, people including Congress wanted to cut funding seeing that the process wasnt going anywhere.
Whereas the State Department and some choice institutions believe that the process of constructive engagement is the best way to achieve progress.Historically it seems that our quarantine of North Korea only led to a near disaster in 1994. The engagement worked here and produced an agreement that still binds the four parties involved.
While there have been bumps in the road, it seems that things are progressing. Unfortunately the famine and widespread poverty in North Korea dampens the situation and requires food aid that would otherwise not be diverted there. This catastrophe might even heighten the situation to the point where North Korea is willing to negotiate in more favor of United States interests. This could come in exchange for a clause to the Agreed Framework whereby food is included in drop-offs of oil and parts for the reactors.This scenario is still tense, with each side attempting to play out the situation to the best of their advantage. I do believe that the best foreign policy option to pursue in light of the situation is the current one; building ties through engagement. It might not produce the desired result to all, but it will keep North Korea from nuclear power and it will provide them with a basis to buildthe power plants. The United States future with North Korea may appear doubtful, but one should not lose hope.
I predict that the North Korean government will collapse or lose power in the next twenty years.They will go out with a brief flash, and then havoc. The reunification process will have already begun by thenmade more possible by joint North-South Korean workers working on the power plants. But just as Russia tumbled into depression even after Gorbachavs attempts at turning the economy into a market economy, Koreas new economy will also.
But I predict that it could grow after that and come to join the ranks of the Asian Tigers in the distant future. When looking at this situation, it appears ominous.We must maintain a narrow margin of hope and build upon it. The North Korean problem will not solve itself. We must be strong and resolute and go through with our policy to the end, whether it be bitter or sweet. Bibliography The Greatest Technology Giveaway, Foreign Affairs Vol.
77 no.5 September/October 1998 – Charles Glaser, The Security Dilemma Revisited, World Politics Vol. 50, no. 1 October 1997 -US Imposes Sanctions on Pakistan, N. Korea Following Missile Test, Arms Control Today Vol.
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3 Summer 1998 pp. 409-422 Internet Resources -U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing(s).
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Presenter: Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ASD (PA). Text on North Korea and August 31, 1998 missile launch http://www.fas.org/news/dprk/1998/t09081998 t9809asd-2.html -Testimony before the House International Relations Committee. Special Envoy for the Korean Peace Process and US Representative to KEDO, Charles Kartman.
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htm -Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Non-Proliferation North Korea http://www.ceip.org/programs/hpp/korea.htm created Sunday November 1, 1998 -Centre for Defense and International Security Studies Devils Brews Briefings: North Korea http://www.cdiss.org/cbwnb3.htm -Centre for Defense and International Security Studies National Briefings: North Korea http://www.
cdiss.org/nkorea b.htm -Heritage Foundation Ten Steps to Address North Koreas Nuclear Threat By Richard V. Allen Executive Memorandum #378 3/31/94 http://www.heritage.org:80/library/categories/forp ol/em378.html -United States Energy Information Administration September 1998 North Korea http://www.
eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nkorea.html -CIA Country Fact Book (online) North Korea http://www.dci -Nuclear Proliferation News (online) Issue no. 10 Friday 10 June 1994 North Korea: IAEA says measurements of fuel rods “impossible” http://www.gn.apc.
org/fhit/npn/npn05.html#T-0033 -CNN World News (online) North Korea Apologizes for submarine intrusion October 29, 1996 http://22.214.171.124/World/9612/29/nkorea/index.
htm l — Fresh round of Korea talks under way in Geneva October 21, 1998 http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9810/21/korea.tal ks/index.html — North Korea asked for cash, US says November 10, 1998 http://cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9811/09/BC-KOREA-NORT H-USA/reut/index.html -Strategic Implications of the US-DPRK Framework Agreement (online) By Thomas L. Wilburn April 3, 1995 http://carlisle-www.
army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs95 /usdprk/usdprkss.htm -SECURITY OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA: U.
S.CONTINUING COMMITMENT Richard S. Jackson Major, United States Air Force Director of Operations 5th Reconnaissance Squadron Osan AB, Republic of Korea http://www.
cadre.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/j ackson.html Other Resources 1. Encyclopedia Britannica.
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